Golden Dome for NATO is better than one for America

President Trump should invite NATO allies to join the Golden Dome Initiative, transforming the proposed Golden Dome for America into a Golden Dome for NATO. Such a shift would better match today’s security realities and send the clear message to potential adversaries that we are united in deterring and defending against nuclear and conventional ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles — peacefully and cost-effectively. Moreover, should a Golden Dome take more, or even far more, than three years to build as Trump has proposed, a NATO Dome would be far more likely to earn bipartisan support in the United States, thereby increasing the chances of development and deployment regardless of which party leads future administrations.

Considering the ways that China and Russia may respond to the development and deployment of the Golden Dome for America, it becomes clear that a Golden Dome for NATO can help the free world better face authoritarian powers. 

China and Russia’s potential reactions to the Golden Dome for America

Based on measures taken by the Soviet Union in response to President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative initiated in 1983, we can reasonably project how China and Russia might counter the centerpiece — a space-based interceptor system — of the Golden Dome in five ways: 

1. Developing a fleet of “space stalkers” — derived from dual-use spacecraft — to disable this space-based system; 
2. Devising countermeasures to better protect their own missiles during boost phase; 
3. Increasing their nuclear missile inventory to compensate for those likely to be intercepted; 
4. Pursuing their own space-based missile defense development; 
5. Pressing for arms control agreements that would involve at least the U.S., China, and Russia.

Space-stalkers. I’ve repeatedly argued that the easiest, cheapest and quickest way for China to stop Golden Dome development would be to destroy it during its formative stage in the next several years. I wrote about how bodyguard spacecraft and self-defense zones could prevent space stalkers from disabling our critical satellites, including those that form and support the space segment of the Golden Dome. In the next five years, China could have a rudimentary stalker swarm capable of disabling around 100 of our critical satellites — severely degrading our ability to intervene if Beijing imposed a sea blockade or full-scale invasion of Taiwan. Even in the 2030s and beyond, rapidly improving stalker swarms will require the U.S. to rely on bodyguards and zones to protect key satellites. 

Boost-phase countermeasures. These are difficult to make effective. For example, shortening missile boost phase could be offset by faster interceptors. Rotating a missile body might prevent a laser from focusing heat on a spot to explode the rocket, but it would not stop an interceptor impacting and destroying it.

Larger nuclear missile arsenals. Expanding China and/or Russia’s missile inventory would not meaningfully degrade the U.S. second-strike capability, given our triad of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, ballistic missile submarines, and long-range nuclear-capable bombers. If adversaries devote scarce resources to more missiles while the U.S. develops powerful space-based defense against both nuclear and conventional (especially hypersonic) missiles, the net advantage will favor the U.S. 

Rival space-based missile defense. China and/or Russia may pursue their own space-based missile defense regardless of U.S. actions. For those who doubt the advantage of being first, consider the ongoing race among the U.S., China and Russia to deploy nuclear reactors on the moon by 2030. The first nation to deploy can claim the most favorable locations — such as the lunar poles, which have permanently shadowed regions at the bottom of craters with extremely low temperatures, suitable for installing radiators to cool the reactor. Likewise, building the first space-based missile defense system allows the U.S. to select the best altitudes and orbits and take the lead in setting rules for keep-out zones and responsible behavior in space.

New arms control. A transformed strategic environment already calls for reforming traditional nuclear and conventional arms controls. Future frameworks should involve the U.S., China and Russia, covering nuclear and advanced conventional (including hypersonic) missiles; missile-defense systems and both offensive and defensive space-to-space, ground-to-space and space-to-ground weapons. Including developing and prospective space- and terrestrial-based missile defenses in such discussions could help nations better balance offensive and defensive forces, thereby enhancing global stability.

Transitioning from national to alliance missile defense

In sum, while China and Russia have several potential counters, none are insurmountable, and each can be managed with sound strategy and technology. The real challenge is choosing a Golden Dome that delivers the greatest benefits to justify its costs, setting the stage for exploring how NATO allies can help resolve strategic, technical and financial challenges of a Golden Dome.

A NATO-wide Golden Dome would reshape the alliance’s defense posture in ways that go far beyond simply expanding coverage. Strategically, it would reinforce the principle that an attack on one is an attack on all — not just in rhetoric, but in concrete defensive capability. A unified missile defense architecture across NATO territory would make it significantly harder for an adversary to target any one nation without confronting the full military and political weight of the alliance.

By extending the shield to European allies, the U.S. would strengthen deterrence against Russia, which has invested heavily in modernizing its missile arsenal, including with Avangard hypersonic glide vehicles and four other novel missiles — each with a nuclear-armed variant, and some with conventional ones. A NATO Dome would signal to Moscow that no member state is left exposed, reducing the temptation for limited strikes aimed at fracturing alliance unity.

NATO members’ existing and future satellites can serve as backups to one another. For example, the European Union’s Galileo navigation satellite system and U.S. GPS have been providing cross-support ever since the U.S. Federal Communications Commission approved the use of Galileo in the U.S. in November 2018. Similarly, NATO‘s military, civil and commercial satellite systems could be integrated for more sophisticated applications and mutual backup.

France, notably, has been developing bodyguard spacecraft to protect its critical satellites since 2019, while the U.S. continues to lag behind. Leveraging allied capabilities would make Golden Dome more resilient and effective. As Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said, “Golden Dome is designed to leverage some past investments but will also use next-generation technology to defend against the evolving, and complex threat landscape.” Including NATO allies in this challenging but game-changing initiative will not only help resolve many technical hurdles in building a cost-effective shield, but also guide us toward pursuing the right technologies to counter our adversaries’ rapidly advancing threats while remaining competitive in commercial markets.

Resolving financial challenges of a Golden Dome

To assess quantitatively how a NATO-wide shield could ease the funding burden for the U.S. — and whether NATO allies could afford to participate — we need some basic financial data and technical insights to make a rough, but useful, estimate. 

Financially, Trump announced a three-year development timeline and a $175 billion budget for a Golden Dome for America, while a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) analysis projected a cost between $161 billion and $542 billion over 20 years. We can also take guidance from the $24.4 billion allocated to the Golden Dome in the FY 2025-FY 2029 reconciliation funding for defense space projects. Of these, $15.7 billion — 64% — is designated for the space segment, with the remaining $8.7 billion set aside for terrestrial (non-space-based) elements. It is no surprise that space assets dominate the budget, since the Dome necessarily requires costly development and deployment of space-based interceptors and sensors to defend the American homeland. I call this 64%-36% division the Space-Terrestrial Cost-Split for the American Dome (STCS-A) Approximation 1. 

Technically, the cost of the space-based segment depends far more on the number and quality of adversary missiles the Dome must defend against than on the physical size of the homeland. Because satellites orbit the globe, only a limited number will be positioned close enough to intercept missiles during their short boost phase. Thus, roughly the same number of interceptors, early-warning satellites and tracking satellites needed for the American Dome would also serve a NATO Dome. In other words, the space-segment cost of an American Dome and a NATO Dome would be about the same. I call this the Same Space-Segment Cost (SSSC) Approximation 2.

In contrast, as a first-order approximation, the terrestrial-segment cost can be assumed to scale with the total homeland area covered. Since the NATO homeland (including the U.S.) is about 2.7 times as large as the U.S. homeland alone, the terrestrial-segment cost for NATO’s homeland defense would likewise be about 2.7 times as large, assuming cost scales with geography. I call this the Proportional Terrestrial–Segment Cost (PTSC) Approximation 3.

To compare the costs of the American Dome and the NATO Dome, I began with CBO’s current projection of the cost of the American Dome: $161 billion to $542 billion. Using the three approximations above, one can then calculate the cost of other relevant domes for comparison. For example, based on that projection, the corresponding cost range for a NATO Dome would be $260 billion to $874 billion. 

Now let us examine, financially, whether it makes more sense to build an American-only Dome or to invite NATO allies to join in building a NATO Dome. Likewise, if NATO allies want such a shield, should they build one on their own or join us in constructing a NATO Dome?

At the 2025 NATO Summit, following Trump’s continued urging since his first term that allies spend more on their own defense, member countries committed to spending 5% of their gross domestic product (GDP) annually on defense by 2035, a significant increase from the pledge of at least 2% at the 2014 Wales Summit. 

Using 2023 defense budget data, the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) found that under the new 5%-of-GDP rule, the U.S. defense commitment should be 54% of the total NATO defense spending. Yet, in 2023, the U.S. share was 69%. In other words, by 2035, every NATO member will be committed to spending 5% of their GDP on defense and the U.S. share will drop to 54%, down from 69%. 

Moreover, PIIE also calculated that, if all members had spent 5% of GDP in 2023, NATO’s total military spending that year would have increased by about $1.150 trillion over the actual 2023 figure of $1.282 trillion. 

Here is an important question that has not been settled — or, even openly discussed — but could force the U.S. to spend as much as $1.1 trillion (in constant 2022 dollars) more between 2025 to 2035, while all members gradually raise their annual defense commitments to reach the 5% of GDP. 

A simple and realistic example helps illustrate the calculation. Assuming this increase phases linearly over the next 10 years, I found that NATO’s defense spending would rise by $115 billion annually, adding up to $6.3 trillion more over the next decade. 

Clearly, if a country is already spending 5% of GDP on defense, it would not need to take part in the phase-in. In 2023, the U.S. spent 3.36% of its GDP or $880 billion — second in percentage only to Poland at 3.83%, which in dollar terms was only $27 billion. Thus, the U.S. should contribute a lower percentage term of its GDP than most others to the buildup. In this example, I calculated that the U.S. share of the $6.3 trillion increase should be 37%, or $2.3 trillion. 

If negotiators mistakenly assume that the U.S. share during the next ten years should already be at the post-2035 rate of 54%, the U.S. would end up committing an unnecessary $1.1 trillion in defense spending over the next decade, repeating the error of paying more than a fair share to NATO.

Similarly, the U.S. should pay 37% of the cost of a NATO Dome, which I estimate at $97 billion to $326 billion. By contrast, building an American-only Dome would cost $161 to $542 billion — about 66% more — yet it would protect only the U.S. homeland. 

However,the protection for the U.S. under a NATO Dome would be the same, but at a far lower cost.

For NATO allies, their share of the $6.3 trillion increase is 63%, or about $4.0 trillion — more than enough to cover their share of the NATO Dome, estimated at $163 billion to $548 billion. If they were to build a separate Dome for themselves, however, the cost would be at $202 billion to $679 billion — about 24% more than their share of building one jointly with the U.S.

Should the cost of building an American Dome change, the cost of a NATO Dome would scale similarly, so the conclusion remains: the NATO Dome is relatively and significantly less expensive — not to mention that it offers vastly superior strategic and technical advantages.

How a NATO Dome helps resolve challenges

Overall, the analysis shows that a NATO-wide Golden Dome addresses the key strategic, technical and financial challenges of building a missile defense system. Strategically, it strengthens deterrence by signaling that an attack on any member confronts the full alliance, and it extends protection to allies — reducing incentives for adversaries to attempt limited strikes. Technically, it leverages allied satellite and space capabilities, including bodyguard spacecraft, to enhance resilience, ensure redundancy, and guide the adoption of next-generation technologies. Financially, both the U.S. and NATO allies would pay more — by 66% and 24% respectively — if they forgo the golden opportunity of one Golden Dome for both, avoiding the cost of an unnecessary second space segment. 

Together, these factors make a NATO Dome both more cost-effective and a stronger shield for collective defense than an American-only system.

A NATO Golden Dome is not just a scaled-up American shield — it is a fundamentally different proposition. By addressing the potential countermeasures China and Russia might employ against a Golden Dome and by leveraging the strategic, technical and financial advantages of alliance-wide participation, it strengthens deterrence, is more cost-effective and enhances collective defense. 

By inviting NATO allies into the Golden Dome Initiative without delay, President Trump could turn a national project into a historic alliance achievement. Done right, the NATO Dome would not only protect our populations and other assets from missile attacks, but also demonstrate, in the clearest possible terms, that the free world stands united against those who would threaten it.

Brian G. Chow is an independent policy analyst with more than 180 publications, including numerous monographs, on space and other national security issues. He is a former Senior Physical Scientist at the RAND Corporation, a role he held for 25 years. In addition to providing routine consulting services to government agencies through RAND, he was independently appointed as a consultant to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the President’s Science Advisor and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy at different times, advising them on specific high-level initiatives. He holds a Ph.D. in physics, an MBA with distinction, and a Ph.D. in finance.

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