The U.S. race to the moon: Why Plan B cannot wait

For years, both the Trump Administration and Congress have clearly stated that returning Americans to the moon before China in the 2028-2030 timeframe is a national priority. It is central to United States leadership in space, to global influence and to the future of human exploration. 

Yet across the space community, a sobering recognition has taken hold: America cannot win this race with the current Human Landing System (HLS) architecture. The system NASA is relying on is extraordinarily complex, burdened by untested technologies — including large-scale in-space refueling — and has slipped repeatedly. Artemis 3 has already moved years to the right with no credible assurance of a landing before 2030.

Congressional hearings, former NASA leaders, the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel and multiple independent analysts have all raised the alarm. 

Meanwhile, China is executing a simple, direct, technically conservative mission plan — making steady progress. Faced with this threat, NASA’s acting administrator Sean Duffy took an essential step by announcing NASA would re-open competition for an alternative lander — a true Plan B. But in his Dec. 3 nomination hearing, Jared Isaacman declined to endorse that path, leaving unclear whether this vital option will move forward 

Some argue that beginning a new lander program now cannot deliver a ready system by 2030. But this is shortsighted. A Plan B lander offers three critical advantages: 

• A simpler, lower risk, lander can be ready by 2030, rather than continuing to depend on a fragile, overly complex architecture that has no conceivable chance of achieving the goal.
• A viable backup for sustained lunar operations, reducing the risk that the U.S. discovers — too late — that its primary approach cannot deliver. 
• Renewed competition, with more assurance of success.

Without a Plan B, we risk waking up one day to find the truth staring us in the face: The U.S. has lost the moon. 

Furthering U.S. space leadership is either a national priority or it isn’t. If it is, then decisive action is required now, as Walt Faulconer argued in his excellent opinion piece America needs a ‘Plan B’ to reach the moon first. The points below build on that case and outline immediate steps forward. 

• The U.S. and NASA need a long-term comprehensive plan for space exploration to the moon and Mars. NASA has not had one for over 15 years.
• Urgency toward a simpler, low-risk architecture. Two months have already passed since Secretary Duffy announced NASA would open competition for a new lander — time we do not have. Every day lost widens the gap between U.S. ambition and Chinese execution. 
• “Fast Track Procurement:” NASA cannot rely on traditional, multi-year procurement cycles. Use OTAs and rapid acquisition authorities to identify a provider within months, not years and move quickly from award. 
• Use existing, proven hardware: A winning Plan B should require no new inventions but utilize modern reliable hardware: Orion-heritage systems; flight-proven thrusters and engines using reliable storable propellants; existing avionics, communications and software; a lander launched fully fueled. Keep it simple, but address NASA requirements such as four crew for a week on the lunar surface.
• Accelerate SLS Block 2 and ground system for higher flight rates: Apply lessons learned from SpaceX ground infrastructure development. Examine Firm Fixed Price contract with NASA insight, not oversight. The SLS was originally designed to fly large cargo-like landers. The basic rocket has been tested and is scheduled to fly a crew around the moon. The basic SLS and Orion are in hand. A lunar lander mission could be flown with two SLS Block 2 launches versus the 10 to 20+ in the current NASA architecture.
• Fund this national priority: A true plan begins with only $15 million for initial definition — negligible in a multi-billion-dollar budget. But success requires stability: The government should establish a multiyear 2030 contingency fund, insulate critical development from Continuing Resolutions and budget turbulence and ensure predictable funding even if not ideal — just as NASA did during the post-1993 ISS redesign. Programs do not fail from underfunding alone — they fail from unpredictable underfunding.
• NASA should establish a dedicated Plan B Program Office that’s separate from current HLS management, with minimum oversight and clear reporting to the administrator as a “Skunk Works” effort including minimum staffing and direct hire/fire authority. This was essentially done during the ISS redesign, with a small central team co-located with selected highly skilled, experienced people from across NASA working with the utmost urgency and motivation. It evolved to a joint NASA/industry team with a prime contractor. The team needs to be assembled finding the best talent from within and outside the agency. It was done in assembling the initial ISS program office. Rebuild strong systems engineering and integration skills within the agency, and particularly in the Exploration Program. This approach would have the highest chance of succeeding in building the earliest possible lander.
• Protect NASA’s broader mission: Severe cuts to science and other programs only fuel internal conflict and undermine support. Policymakers should pursue a balanced, rational plan that defends science, exploration and technology together, not one at the expense of another. Make efficiency cuts after in-depth strategic planning, not draconian across the board reductions.

NASA and Congressional leadership is united in supporting space exploration objectives, in sending people to the moon and Mars. It is important to maintain U.S. leadership in space and do everything possible to land our Astronauts on the moon first and forever. We need the best talent and experience pulling the same direction to get there. We need a stable budget to avoid having the programs limping from one year to the next as they have been. It’s not too late to land Americans on the moon before China and ensure we stay, but the opportunity is rapidly closing if we don’t act with urgency and focus. 

Doug Cooke is an aerospace consultant with over 49 years in NASA programs.

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